chore(auth): remove security plan doc and marker comments

SECURITY_PASSWORD_PLAN.md

@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-# Password Security Hardening Plan
-
-## Scope
-- Applies to auth and password flows in:
-  - `index.js`
-  - `auth/authEmail.js`
-  - `mongoDB.js`
-
-## 1. Replace insecure reset flow with single-use token login
-- Problem:
-  - Current flow resets by username and emails a plaintext temporary password.
-- Implementation:
-  - Keep `POST /resetPassword` as token request endpoint:
-    - Accept identifier (email/username).
-    - Always return generic success response.
-    - If account exists, create one-time login token with short TTL (15-30 min), store hashed token, email link.
-  - Add `POST /password/token-login`:
-    - Accept token.
-    - Validate token (exists, not expired, unused), mark used atomically, then create normal auth session cookies.
-  - Data model:
-    - New collection `password_login_tokens` with fields:
-      - `userId`, `tokenHash`, `expiresAt`, `usedAt`, `createdAt`, `requestMeta`.
-    - Add TTL index on `expiresAt`.
-
-## 2. Remove credential handling from GET/query
-- Problem:
-  - `/signup` and `/login` accept GET and query params for credentials.
-- Implementation:
-  - Change auth routes to `POST` only.
-  - Read credentials from JSON body only.
-  - Reject query-based credential inputs with `400`.
-  - Update Swagger docs and clients accordingly.
-
-## 3. Add account-aware brute-force protection
-- Problem:
-  - Only global IP limiter exists; auth endpoints are not sufficiently protected.
-- Implementation:
-  - Add dedicated limiter middleware for auth endpoints (`/login`, `/password/request-reset`, `/password/confirm-reset`):
-    - Combined key: normalized username/email + source IP.
-    - Lower thresholds and progressive backoff/lockout window.
-  - Add telemetry for blocked attempts.
-  - Optionally store counters in Redis if horizontally scaled.
-
-## 4. Prevent account enumeration
-- Problem:
-  - API exposes different responses for unknown user vs wrong password.
-- Implementation:
-  - Login: same response for invalid credentials regardless of user existence.
-  - Reset request: always same response regardless of account existence.
-  - Keep detailed reason only in internal logs/analytics.
-
-## 5. Keep strong password hashing policy (clarify bcrypt behavior)
-- Problem:
-  - Existing TODO comments incorrectly state bcrypt needs manual salt handling.
-- Implementation:
-  - Keep bcrypt (or migrate to Argon2id in a separate change set).
-  - Centralize hash policy:
-    - cost factor (benchmark-backed; start at 12 if acceptable latency).
-    - minimum password length and strength checks.
-  - On login, detect outdated hash params and rehash after successful auth.
-
-## Suggested rollout order
-1. Tokenized login flow (new endpoint + DB token store).
-2. POST-only auth route enforcement.
-3. Generic auth/reset responses.
-4. Dedicated auth rate limiting.
-5. Hash policy tuning + opportunistic rehash.
-
-## Validation checklist
-- Unit/integration tests:
-  - token creation, expiry, one-time use, invalid token paths.
-  - login generic error response behavior.
-  - auth rate limiter trigger and cooldown.
-  - query credential rejection.
-- Manual:
-  - verify no plaintext password emails are sent.
-  - verify token cannot be reused after first successful consumption.

auth/authEmail.js

@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ const createSessionFromUser = async ({ DB, user, req, res }) => {
 // When new users are subscribed, they have a single profile, which is the personal one.
 // Other profiles can be link to that user, like groups or courses.
 const signup = async function (req, res) {
-    // SECURITY FIX (#2): only accept credentials from request body.
     const username = (req.body.username || "").trim().toLowerCase();
     const password = req.body.password;
     const email = (req.body.email || "").trim().toLowerCase();
@@ -68,9 +67,6 @@ const signup = async function (req, res) {
     }
     let isUserAlreadyRegistered = await DB.getUser(email);
     if (isUserAlreadyRegistered && isUserAlreadyRegistered._id) return res.json({ status: "This user is already registered" });
-    // SECURITY PLAN (point #5):
-    // bcrypt.hash already includes a per-password salt.
-    // Future hardening: centralize cost factor policy (and consider rehash-on-login).
     const hashedPassword = await bcrypt.hash(password, 10);
     const newUserObject = await DB.newUser({
         username,
@@ -115,7 +111,6 @@ const login = async function (req, res) {
         if (userInfo) return res.redirect('/');
     }
     const invalidCredentials = () => res.status(401).json({ status: "Invalid credentials" });
-    // SECURITY FIX (#2): only accept credentials from request body.
     const username = (req.body.username || req.body.email || "").trim().toLowerCase();
     const password = req.body.password || "";
     if (!username || !password) return invalidCredentials();
@@ -128,11 +123,7 @@ const login = async function (req, res) {
             properties: { username },
         });
     }
-    // SECURITY PLAN (point #5):
-    // bcrypt.compare validates salted hashes directly; no manual salt parameter is needed.
-    // SECURITY FIX (#4): compare against dummy hash when user doesn't exist to reduce timing side-channel.
     const isSamePassword = await bcrypt.compare(password, user?.password || DUMMY_BCRYPT_HASH);
-    // SECURITY FIX (#4): same response for non-existing user and wrong password.
     if (!user || !isSamePassword) return invalidCredentials();
     try {
         return res.json(await createSessionFromUser({ DB, user, req, res }));
@@ -170,7 +161,6 @@ const logout = async function (req, res) {
 const resetPassword = async function (req, res) {
     const DB = await MongoDB.getDB;
 
-    // SECURITY FIX (#1): issue a single-use token instead of sending/changing passwords.
     const genericResetResponse = {
         status: "ok",
         details: "If the account exists, check your email for next steps"

index.js

@@ -72,7 +72,6 @@ const { authRateLimiter } = require('./middleware/authRateLimiter');
  *       400:
  *         description: Bad request.
  */
-// SECURITY FIX (#2): POST-only signup to avoid query-string credential leakage.
 app.post('/signup', signup);
 /**
  * @swagger
@@ -106,7 +105,6 @@ app.post('/signup', signup);
  *       401:
  *         description: Invalid credentials.
  */
-// SECURITY FIX (#2): POST-only login to avoid query-string credential leakage.
 app.post('/login', authRateLimiter('login'), login);
 /**
  * @swagger
@@ -156,8 +154,6 @@ app.get('/logout', logout);
  *         description: Bad request.
  */
 app.route('/resetPassword').post(authRateLimiter('reset'), resetPassword);
-// SECURITY FIX (#1):
-// Single-use token login endpoint for password recovery flow.
 /**
  * @swagger
  * /password/token-login: